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Abstract
In the non-volatile memory, ensuring the security and
correctness of persistent data is fundamental. However,
the security and persistence issues are usually studied
independently in existing work. To achieve both data secu-
rity and persistence, simply combining existing persistence
schemes with memory encryption is inefficient due to crash
inconsistency and significant performance degradation. To
bridge the gap between security and persistence, this paper
proposes SecPM, a Secure and Persistent Memory system,
which consists of a counter cache write-through (CWT)
scheme and a locality-aware counter write reduction (CWR)
scheme. Specifically, SecPM leverages the CWT scheme to
guarantee the crash consistency via ensuring both the data
and its counter are durable before the data flush completes,
and leverages the CWR scheme to improve the system
performance via exploiting the spatial locality of counter
storage, log and data writes. We have implemented SecPM
in gem5 with NVMain and evaluated it using five widely-
used workloads. Extensive experimental results demonstrate
that SecPM reduces up to half of write requests and speeds
up the transaction execution by 1.3× ∼ 2.0× via using the
CWR scheme, and achieves the performance close to an un-
encrypted persistent memory system for large transactions.
1 Introduction
As DRAM suffers from limited scalability and high power
leakage [30, 45], non-volatile memories (NVM), such as
PCM [48], ReRAM [1], STT-RAM [2], and 3D XPoint [17],
become promising candidates of the next-generation main
memory. NVM has the advantages of high scalability,
high density, and near-zero standby power. However,
two fundamental issues need to be addressed in order
to effectively use NVM in memory systems, i.e., data
persistence and security.
• Persistence Issue. The non-volatility of NVM en-
ables data to be persistently stored into main memory for
instantaneous failure recovery. In order to ensure the
correctness of persistent data, crash consistency guarantee
is fundamental [32, 47], which needs to achieve the correct
recovery of persistent data in case of a system failure, e.g.,
power failure and system crash. Specifically, NVM systems
typically contain volatile storage components, e.g., CPU
caches and possible DRAM. If a system failure occurs when
a data structure in NVM is being updated, the data structure
may be left in a corrupted state. Moreover, modern processor
and memory controller usually reorder memory writes. The
partial update and reordering cause the crash inconsistency
in NVM [26, 53]. Hence, cache line flush, memory barrier,
and log-based mechanisms are used to ensure the crash
consistency [28, 50].
• Security Issue. The non-volatility of NVM also causes
the security problem of data remanence vulnerability [3, 55],
since NVM still retains data after systems are powered down.
In general, when using encryption to protect data security,
the encrypted data are stored in disks, while raw data are
retained in main memory [12]. In the legacy DRAM main
memory, if a DRAM DIMM is stolen, data are quickly lost
due to the volatility. Unlike it, if an NVM DIMM is stolen,
an attacker can directly stream out the data from the DIMM.
Hence, memory encryption becomes important to ensure the
data security in NVM. Counter mode encryption [27, 55]
is usually used in secure NVM, due to the low decryption
latency and high security level.
However, existing schemes addressing the persistence is-
sue [22, 32, 38, 47, 50] usually fail to efficiently use memory
encryption in NVM systems. On the other hand, existing
schemes addressing the security issue [3, 7, 44, 55, 59] are
inefficient to guarantee the data consistency. To achieve both
data persistence and security in NVM, simply combining
existing persistence schemes with memory encryption does
not work due to the following challenges.
• Consistency Challenge. In order to guarantee crash
consistency, it is essential to use cache line flush andmemory
barrier instructions to persist data into NVM with correct
ordering. In the counter mode encryption, each memory
line is encrypted and decrypted using a counter, and the
counter increases one on each write [27]. Thus each
write in the secure NVM has to persist two data including
the data itself and its counter [29]. The data is evicted
from the CPU caches and the counter is evicted from the
counter cache managed by the memory controller. The two
writes have to be simultaneously persisted to ensure that
the persistent data can be correctly decrypted across system
failures. For example, if the system fails after the encrypted
data is persisted into NVM, but before its counter has been
persisted, the persisted data cannot be decrypted without the
correct counter during the recovery from a system failure.
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However, current computer systems fail to simultaneously
persist the two writes, thus resulting in an inconsistent state
on a system failure [29, 43]. This is because cache line flush
and memory barrier instructions only ensure the data from
the CPU caches to be correctly persisted into NVM, which
fail to operate the counter cache and hence cannot ensure the
crash consistency of counters.
• Performance Challenge. Each data write in the
secure NVM generates two NVM write requests (one
writes the data and the other writes its counter), which
significantly degrades the system performance. Because
writes to NVM usually incur much higher latency than
reads (i.e., 3 ∼ 8×) [35, 57], and are in the critical path of
application execution due to persistence requirements [46,
47]. Moreover, more write requests also significantly
increase the latency of read requests to the same bank. When
a write request is served by an NVM bank, the following read
and write requests to the same bank are blocked and have to
wait until the current write request is completed [34].
To bridge the gap between security and persistence, this
paper proposes a secure and persistent memory system,
called SecPM. SecPM proposes to use a simple yet effective
counter cache write-through (CWT) scheme with a register
to ensure the crash consistency of both data and counters.
CWT appends the counter of the data in the write queue
during encrypting the data, which ensures the counter is
durable before the data flush completes. Thus the two
writes for the data and its counter are performed in an
atomic manner. Moreover, SecPM leverages a locality-
aware counter write reduction (CWR) scheme to improve the
system performance. CWR explores and exploits the spatial
locality of counter storage, log and data writes to mergewrite
requests from counters in the write queue, thus significantly
reducing the number of NVM write requests. In summary,
this paper makes the following contributions:
• Simple yet Effective Consistency Guarantee. Existing
work adds new primitives in the programming language
to explicitly flush programmer-specified counter cache
lines in the counter cache for consistency guaran-
tee [29], which however incurs modifications on both
hardware and software layers. The novelty of SecPM is
to leverage a simple yet effective counter cache write-
through (CWT) scheme with a register to guarantee the
crash consistency of secure NVM. Our scheme is able
to ensure both data and counters to be simultaneously
persisted before a CPU cache line flush instruction is
retired.
• Significant Performance Improvement. SecPM lever-
ages a locality-aware counter write reduction (CWR)
scheme to improve system performance via signifi-
cantly reducing the number of NVM write requests
from counters. Extensive experimental results demon-
strate that SecPM reduces up to half of write requests,
and speeds up the transaction execution by 1.3 ∼
2.0 times by using the CWR scheme, and achieves
the performance close to an un-encrypted persistent
memory system for large transactions.
• Programmer-transparent Implementation. The im-
plementation of SecPM only needs to perform slight
modifications on the hardware layer without any mod-
ifications on the software layer, e.g., programming
language and compiler, which are transparent for
programmers and applications. Thus the programs and
applications running on an un-encrypted NVM can be
directly executed on a secure NVM with SecPM.
2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Consistency Guarantee for Persistence
In order to correctly persist data into NVM, it is important to
guarantee the crash consistency. Durable transaction [22, 28]
is a commonly used solution for crash consistency guarantee,
which enables a group of memory updates to be performed
in an atomic manner. Figure 1 shows the pseudo-code that
an application implements a durable transaction with undo
logging, which include three stages, i.e., prepare, mutate
and commit. Specifically, the prepare stage creates a log
entry to back up the data to be written; the mutate stage
modifies the data in place; the commit stage invalidates the
log entry created in the prepare stage. Whichever stage a
system failure occurs, the application can be recoverable in
a consistent state since at least one of the log and data are
consistent.
As modern CPU and memory controller usually reorder
memory writes, the durable transaction uses cache line
flush and memory barrier instructions to enforce write
ordering [22, 28, 32]. The flush instructions including
clflush, clflushopt, and clwb explicitly flush a dirty
CPU cache line into the write queue of the memory
controller. The memory barrier instructions including
mfence and sfence order the memory operations via
blocking the memory operations after the fence, until the
memory operations before the fence complete. The pcommit
instruction was initially used to force the write requests
DurableTx(data, log) {
do some computation;
// Prepare stage: backing up the data in log 
write undo log;
flush log;
memory_barrier();
// Mutate stage: updating the data in place 
write data;
flush data;
memory_barrier();
// Commit stage: invalidating the log
log->valid = false;
flush log->valid;
memory_barrier();
}
Figure 1: Steps implementing a durable transaction.
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in the write queue into NVM but was deprecated later by
Intel [18], due to the use of asynchronous DRAM refresh
(ADR) mechanism [19, 29, 41]. ADR is able to persist the
write requests in the write queue into NVM in case of a
system failure via the battery backup. Therefore, the cache
lines reaching the write queue are considered durable.
2.2 Memory Encryption for Security
Since NVM suffers from the data remanence vulnerability,
memory encryption is non-trivial for NVM to ensure data
security.
2.2.1 Security Guarantee of Encryption
A straightforward method to encrypt a memory line is to use
a block cipher algorithm, e.g., AES [11], with a global key,
as shown in Figure 2a. However, an attacker can knowwhich
lines have the same content via simply comparing encrypted
lines, since all lines are encrypted using the same key, which
is vulnerable to dictionary and replay attacks [3, 55]. Using
the key along with the line address to encrypt each line is
a more secure method, as shown in Figure 2b, which can
ensure that different lines are encrypted with different keys.
However, this method is still vulnerable to the dictionary
attack for a single line, if an attacker monitors consecutive
writes to this line.
AES-ctrAddr
Line
Encrypted Line
Key
Ctr
AES-ctr
Addr
Line
Encrypted Line
Key
AESKey
Line
Encrypted Line
(a) Key (c) Key + Addr + Ctr(b) Key + Addr
Figure 2: The encryption methods (a) using a global key;
(b) using a key and line address; (c) using a key, line address
and a counter (ctr).
A secure method is to encrypt each line by using the
key and line address in conjunction with a per-line counter,
as shown in Figure 2c. The counter increases by one on
each write and hence consecutive writes to the same line are
encrypted with different keys, achieving high security level.
2.2.2 Latency Reduction via One Time Pad
As memory reads are in the critical path of program
execution, memory encryption causes the high decryption
latency after each memory read due to serial execution,
as shown in Figure 3a, thus significantly degrading the
system performance. Counter mode encryption [27] is
hence proposed to reduce the decryption latency from the
critical path of memory reads via leveraging the One Time
Pad (OTP) technique, and hence has been widely used in
Decryption
Memory Access
Time
(a) Serial
(b) Parallel
Reduced 
Latency
Memory Access
One Time Pad
Figure 3: Reducing the decryption latency using One Time
Pad (OTP).
encrypted memory systems [3, 7, 44, 55, 59]. The main idea
is to compute an OTP in parallel with a memory read, and
then XOR the OTP with the ciphertext data to generate the
plaintext, thus hiding the decryption latency in the memory
access latency, as shown in Figure 3b.
2.2.3 Operations of Counter Mode Encryption
The security of counter mode encryption is based on the
premise that each OTP is never reused for data encryp-
tion [27, 44, 55, 59]. To ensure this, the counter mode
encryption uses a secret key, the line address and the per-
line counter to generate the OTP through the AES circuit, as
shown in Figure 4. For a memory write, the cache line to
be written is encrypted by XORing its content with the OTP.
To read a memory line, we decrypt it by XORing its content
with the OTP. All counters are retained in main memory. In
order to reduce the generation time of OTPs, the memory
controller manages an on-chip counter cache to buffer the
recently-accessed counters [29, 44, 59].
AES-ctr
LineAddr Counter
Key +
Plaintext Plaintext
+
Ciphertext Ciphertext
Encryption Decryption
OTP
Figure 4: The encryption and decryption process in counter
mode encrpytion.
2.3 The Gap between Persistence & Security
Each cache line flushed from CPU caches in the encrypted
NVM produces two write requests: one for the data and the
other for the counter. This characteristic not only degrades
the system performance since NVM needs to deal with
more write requests, but also incurs the crash inconsistency
problem. The reason is that the data is evicted from the
CPU caches but its counter is evicted from the counter cache.
However, the cache line flush instruction only flushes the
data in CPU caches, but fails to operate the counter cache.
The memory barrier instruction only ensures the ordering of
the CPU cache line flushes, but cannot work for the counter
writes [29, 43]. As a result, the data and its counter cannot be
simultaneously persisted, and thus the persisted data cannot
be decrypted without correct counters during the recovery
from a system failure.
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Table 1: The recoverability when a system failure occurs in
the different stages of a transaction.
Stage Log
Content
Log
Counter
Data
Content
Data
Counter
Recoverable ?
Prepare Wrong Wrong Correct Correct Yes
Mutate Correct Unknown Wrong Wrong No
Commit Correct Unknown Correct Unknown No
We analyze the recoverability when a system failure
occurs in the different stages of a durable transaction
executed in an encrypted NVM, as shown in Table 1. We
observe when a system failure occurs in the mutate and
commit stages, the data are unrecoverable. Specifically,
when a system failure occurs in the prepare stage, the data
contents and the counters encrypting the data are unmodified
and correct, which are in a consistent state. However, when
a system failure occurs in the mutate stage, the data are not
updated completely and become wrong. The contents of the
log are correct due to the use of log flush and memory barrier
instructions, but whether the counters encrypting the log are
correctly persisted is unknown, since the cache line flush
and memory barrier instructions fail to operate the counters
stored in the counter cache. Hence, during a recovery, the log
cannot be decrypted due to no correct counters, thus failing
to recover the logged data. For the same reasons, when a
system failure occurs in the commit stage, the correctness of
both log and data counters are unknown, and hence the data
are unrecoverable.
To address the inconsistency problem in the encrypted
NVM, Liu et al. [29] proposed the novel concept
of the selective counter-atomicity for the first time,
which indicates that either both data and its associated
counter have been simultaneously persisted or not. To
efficiently implement the counter-atomicity, software and
hardware layers need to be modified [29]. First, two
new primitives including CounterAtomic variable and
counter_cache_writeback() function, are added in the
programming language to explicitly flush programmer-
specified counter cache lines. Second, the compiler is
modified to support the new primitives. Third, a counter
write queue is added into the memory controller to schedule
the counter and data writes. As a result, the programs
initially running on a system with the un-encrypted NVM
cannot directly run on a system with the secure NVM.
Our work aims for a different design goal. The proposed
SecPM is a programmer-transparent solution to guarantee
the crash consistency of the secure NVM without the needs
of modifications on programming language and compiler,
which is detailed in the rest of the paper.
3 The SecPM Design
3.1 Threat Model
Our threat model is similar to existing work on secure
NVM [3, 29, 44, 55, 59], which aims to protect NVM from
two well-known physical access based attacks, including
Last Level Cache
Memory Controller
AES-ctr
Counter 
Cache
The Write Queue (ADR)
OTP
Plaintext
CiphertextCounter
Counter
Encrypted NVMMCounters
Figure 5: The hardware architecture of SecPM. (The
asynchronous DRAM refresh (ADR) mechanism is able to
persist write requests in the write queue into NVMM on a
system failure via the battery backup. Therefore, the cache
lines reaching the write queue are considered durable.)
stolen DIMM and bus snooping attacks. In the stolen
DIMM attack, since NVM still retains data after systems are
powered down, an attacker can easily stream out the data
stored in the NVM after stealing the NVMDIMM. In the bus
snooping attack, since NVM is accessed through thememory
bus, an attacker can insert a bus snooper to obtain the data
through the bus. We do not consider bus tampering attacks
in the threat model like existing work [3, 29, 44, 55, 59].
These attacks can be defended via Merkle Trees based
authentication techniques [42, 54], which are orthogonal to
our work.
3.2 An Architectural Overview
To bridge the gap between security and persistence in NVM,
we propose SecPM, a Secure Persistent Memory system,
which leverages a simple yet effective counter cache write-
through scheme (§3.3) with a register to guarantee the crash
consistency of both data and its counter, and a counter write
reduction scheme (§3.4) to significantly reduce the number
of write requests for improving the system performance.
Moreover, SecPM guarantees the consistency of page re-
encryption that handles counter overflow by reusing the
ADR mechanism (§3.5).
The hardware architecture of SecPM is shown in Figure 5.
When CPU issues a flush instruction, the corresponding
cache line is evicted from the last level cache to the memory
controller. The memory controller encrypts the cache line
using a counter and then appends the encrypted cache line
in the write queue. The proposed counter cache write-
through (CWT) scheme is performed in the counter cache,
and the counter write reduction (CWR) scheme is performed
in the write queue. As a whole, SecPM only performs slight
hardware modifications on the memory controller, which
are transparent for programmers and applications. Thus
programs and applications running on an un-encryptedNVM
can be directly executed on a secure NVM with SecPM.
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Figure 6: The sequence that the memory controller deals
with a cache line flush by using the counter cache write-
through scheme. (Flu(A): flushing the cache line A into
NVM; Ac: the counter of A; App(Ac): appending Ac in the
write queue; Enc(A): encrypting A; Ret(A): the flush of A is
retired.)
3.3 Crash Consistency Guarantee
3.3.1 Counter Cache Write Through Scheme
SecPM employs a counter cache write-through (CWT)
scheme in the counter cache, which writes each dirty counter
in the counter cache, and simultaneously writes the counter
copy in the write queue. We further show how to schedule
the cache line flush via using the simple CWT scheme to
ensure the crash consistency of the secure NVM.
Figure 6 shows the sequence diagram that the memory
controller deals with a cache line flush in SecPM. When the
CPU issues a flush for cache line A (Flu(A)), the memory
controller reads the counter of A from the counter cache
(Read(Ac)), and then adds the counter by one (Ac++). The
updated counter is used to encrypt A (Enc(A)). During the
encryption, the updated counter is written back to the counter
cache, and simultaneously appended in the write queue
(App(Ac)) via the CWT scheme. After the encrypted A is
appended in the write queue (App(A)), the memory controller
sends an ack (Ack(A)) to the CPU, and the cache line flush is
retired (Ret(A)). From Figure 6, we observe that the counter
encrypting a CPU cache line has been already appended in
the write queue before the cache line flush completes via the
CWT scheme. Hence, if the contents of log and data have
been persisted and become correct, their counters have also
been persisted.
Table 2: The recoverability when a system failure occurs in
the different stages of a transaction in SecPM.
Stage Log
Content
Log
Counter
Data
Content
Data
Counter
Recoverable ?
Prepare Wrong Wrong Correct Correct Yes
Mutate Correct Correct Wrong Wrong Yes
Commit Correct Correct Correct Correct Yes
Table 2 shows the recoverability when a system failure
occurs in the different stages of executing a durable trans-
action in SecPM. In the prepare stage, the contents and
counters of data are un-modified and thus correct. When
the prepare stage completes, it means that all contents of
the log have been successfully flushed and persisted. As we
demonstrate above, if the contents of log have been persisted,
their counters have also been persisted by using the CWT
scheme. Hence, both the contents and counters of the log
Figure 7: The sequence that the memory controller deals
with a cache line flush by using the counter cache write-
through scheme with a register. (Sto(Ac): storing Ac in the
register.)
have been persisted and thus are correct in the mutate stage.
For the same reason, in the commit stage, the contents and
counters of the log and data are correct. We observe that at
least one of log and data are correct whichever stage a system
failure occurs in, and hence the system can be recoverable in
a consistent state.
Recovery: After a system failure occurs, the recovery
scheme of transactions in SecPM is the same as that in an
un-encrypted persistent memory. During the recovery, the
application scans the log region, and checks each log entry.
For each log entry, the application checks whether the log is
complete via the log-end tag of a transaction. If the log is
incomplete, it means the system crashes in the prepare stage
of the transaction, in which the original data are correct. The
application directly abandons the incomplete log. If the log
is complete, it means the system crashes in the mutate or
commit stage, in which the log is correct. The application
undoes the data via the log. Therefore, the application can
be recovered in a consistent state in SecPM.
3.3.2 A Register for Atomic Write Consistency
In addition to using durable transaction, some existing work,
e.g., wB+-tree [5], WORT [26], FAST&FAIR [16], and level
hashing [58], exploits the atomic write of NVM to ensure
the crash consistency of data structures, thus avoiding the
overhead of logging or copy-on-write mechanisms. How-
ever, simply performing the proposed counter cache write-
through (CWT) scheme cannot ensure the crash consistency
of the atomic-write data. Specifically, we consider that
the flush for cache line A as shown in Figure 6 is an
atomic write, without the data backup based on logging.
If a system failure occurs after appending the counter of A
(App(Ac)) before appending A (App(A)) in the write queue,
the counter of A (Ac) is updated and persisted in NVM using
the asynchronous DRAM refresh (ADR) mechanism but A
is not. After the system is recovered from the failure, the
old value of A cannot be decrypted using the new counter. A
is an atomic write without data backup, thus resulting in an
inconsistent state.
To guarantee the crash consistency of atomic writes in the
encrypted NVM, we add a register for each AES circuit.
During encrypting the data (i.e., a cache line) evicted from
CPU caches, we store its corresponding counter in the
register (Sto(Ac)) instead of directly appending the counter
in the write queue, as shown in Figure 7. After finishing
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m64
64 minor counters
 (each 7 bit)
……m3M
64B
m1 m2
Major counter
 (64 bit)
Figure 8: The counter storage of memory lines in a physical
page. (A 4KB page includes 64 memory lines. Each memory
line is encrypted using the major counter concatenated with
a minor counter.)
encrypting the data, we first store the encrypted data in
the register (Sto(Ac)), and then simultaneously append the
encrypted data and its counter in the write queue (App(Ac+
A)). We observe that both data and its associated counter
simultaneously exist in the write queue or not, by using a
register. As a result, the crash consistency of atomic writes
is ensured in SecPM. Moreover, since the size of the register
is very small, i.e., 2 cache lines (one for the data cache line
and the other for its counter cache line), and reads and writes
in such a small register are very fast, the use of the register
has a negligible impact on the system performance.
3.4 Counter Write Reduction
In the secure NVM, each CPU cache line flush appends
two write requests in the write queue, which doubles the
number of write requests, compared with an un-encrypted
NVM. Thus the performance of the memory system would
significantly decrease. SecPM proposes a locality-aware
counter write reduction (CWR) scheme to improve the
system performance via leveraging the spatial locality of
counter storage, log and data writes.
3.4.1 Spatial Locality of Counter Storage
In order to reduce the storage overhead of counters, the
counter mode encryption uses a shared major counter (M)
for an entire page and 64 minor counters (m1, m2, ..., m64)
each for a memory line in the 4KB page [3, 52], as shown
in Figure 8. The major counter is 64 bits and each minor
counter is 7 bits. Thus the counters of all memory lines in a
page are 64B and stored in one memory line, exhibiting good
spatial locality.
In a page, each memory line is encrypted by the per-page
major counter concatenated with a per-line minor counter.
When a memory line is rewritten, its corresponding minor
counter increases by one. Although updating a minor counter
only modifies several bits, persisting the minor counter has
to write the entire memory line into NVM since a memory
line is the basic unit of memory writes. When a minor
counter overflows, counter mode encryption increases the
major counter by one, resets all minor counters to 0, and
re-encrypts all memory lines in the page using the new
counters [52]. The process of re-encrypting a page is
presented in Section 3.5. The 64-bit major counter cannot
AcA
The write queue 
(Each cell is a cache line to be written into NVM)
……BcBCcCDcD
The log contents The counters of log contents
(a) The write queue without CWR
A
The write queue 
(1:  from CPU caches; 0:  from the counter cache)
……BCDcD
1 0 1 1 1
The counters of A, B, and C are removed
(b) The write queue with CWR
Figure 9: An illustration of the write queue when writing a
log with and without CWR scheme.
overflow throughout the lifespan of an NVM, since the count
range, i.e., 264 ≈ 1020, is far larger than the cell endurance
limit of NVM, e.g., 107 ∼ 109 for PCM [35, 57] and 108 ∼
1012 for ReRAM [24, 25].
3.4.2 Spatial Locality of Log and Data Writes
Since a log is stored in a contiguous region in NVM, the
log writes of a transaction flush multiple cache lines which
have the contiguous physical addresses, thus having good
spatial locality. Moreover, the data writes of a transaction
usually have good spatial locality, since programs usually
allocate a contiguous memory region for a transaction [15].
Hence, the cache lines flushed into the contiguous region
have the contiguous physical addresses. For example, a
transaction inserts a 1KB key-value item into a key-value
store maintained in NVM, which will flush 16 cache lines
with the contiguous physical addresses.
3.4.3 Counter Write Reduction Scheme
Based on the locality of counter storage, log and data writes,
we show the write queue during flushing the log entry of
a transaction in Figure 9a. The log entry contains multiple
cache lines (i.e., A, B, C, and D) with contiguous physical
addresses in the same physical page. Since all counters
of a page are contained in one memory line as shown in
Figure 8, the counter cache lines of the log entry, i.e., Ac,
Bc, Cc, and Dc, will be written to the same memory line.
Moreover, since these counter cache lines are evicted from
the write-through counter cache, the latter counter cache
lines contain the updated contents of the former ones with
the same address. For example, the memory lines A, B, C
and D correspond to the minor counters m1, m2, m3 and m4,
respectively. Ac, Bc, Cc, and Dc are written into NVM in
order, as shown in Figure 10a. We observe that the counter
cache line Ac only contains the updated minor counter m1
′,
and the counter cache line Bc contains the updated minor
counters m1
′ and m2
′, and the counter cache lineCc contains
the updated minor counters m1
′, m2
′ and m3
′. Moreover, the
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(a) In-order writes (b) Out-of-order writes
Figure 10: The contents of the corresponding counter cache
lines when the CPU cache lines A, B, C and D are flushed in
order or out of order.
multiple cache lines of a log entry, i.e., A, B, C and D, may
be flushed from CPU caches out of order. For example, B, D,
C and A are flushed in turn. Thus the corresponding counter
cache lines are written into the write queue in the order of
Bc, Dc,Cc and Ac. In this case, it is still valid that the counter
cache lines written latter contain the updated contents of the
former ones, as shown in Figure 10b.
According to above observations and insights, we present
a counter write reduction (CWR) scheme. Specifically, when
a new counter cache line evicted from the counter cache
reaches the write queue, we check whether a counter cache
line in the write queue has the same physical address as
the new one. If yes, we remove this existing counter cache
line without causing any loss of data, since the new counter
cache line contains the updated contents of the removed one
as shown in Figure 10. To reduce the latency of checking
the cache lines with the same address, we add a one-bit flag
for each cache line in the write queue. The flag is used to
distinguish whether a cache line is from CPU caches or the
counter cache. , e.g., ‘1’ for the cache lines fromCPU caches
and ‘0’ for those from the counter cache. Thus we can check
the cache lines only from the counter cache based on the
flag. By performing the CWR scheme, the new write queue
is shown in Figure 9b. We observe that the number of write
requests is significantly reduced, since the counters of A, B
andC are removed. When a transaction flushes a log with the
size of one page, 64 ∗ 2 = 128 CPU and counter cache lines
are written into NVM without our proposed CWR scheme.
By using CWR, only 64+ 1 = 65 cache lines are written,
reducing almost half of NVM writes.
3.5 Page Re-encryption to Handle Overflow
In the counter mode encryption, the major counter cannot
overflow, as discussed in Section 3.4.1. When the minor
counter of a memory line in a page overflows, the page
needs to be re-encrypted using the updated major counter.
In the following, we first present the page re-encryption
process in existing work [6, 52], which however causes the
problem of crash inconsistency for persistent memory. We
then present how to guarantee crash consistency during page
re-encryption in SecPM.
To re-encrypt a page, all memory lines in this page are
read into the last level cache. These memory lines are then
re-encrypted one by one using the updated major counter
concatenatedwith a zeroedminor counter, and finally written
back into main memory. During re-encrypting these memory
lines, a re-encryption status register (RSR) maintained in the
memory controller is used to track the re-encryption status
of each memory line within a page [52]. The RSR stores
the page number and the old major counter of the page. The
RSR also maintains a done bit for each memory line within
the page to indicate whether the corresponding memory line
has already been re-encrypted. After all the 64 done bits are
set to ‘1’ in the RSR, re-encryption of this page is complete
and the RSR is freed.
Existing work [52] demonstrates that the latency of page
re-encryption can be near-completely reduced from the
critical path of processor execution, thus having a negligible
impact on the system performance. Since the RSR tracks
the re-encryption status of each line within a page that is
being re-encrypted, the CPU caches are able to continue to
service regular memory access (read and flush) requests to
other pages and the processor is not stalled. For an access
to a memory line in the page that is being re-encrypted,
there are two cases based on the re-encryption status of the
line recorded in the RSR. 1) If the line has been already
re-encrypted, i.e., its done bit is ‘1’, the access normally
proceeds. 2) If the line is not re-encrypted, i.e., its done
bit is ‘0’, the access simply waits for the re-encryption of
the line. Moreover, Huang et al. [14] and Swami et al. [43]
show that the counter mode encryption can be combinedwith
NVM wear-level techniques [35, 39], and thus the frequency
of page re-encryption is significantly reduced.
However, when the page re-encryption process is executed
in persistent memory, if a system failure occurs during re-
encrypting a page, some memory lines within the page have
been re-encrypted but others have not. Moreover, the re-
encryption status and page number recorded in the RSR are
lost. After recovery, the system does not know which page is
being re-encrypted and which memory lines in this page have
not been re-encrypted. As a result, the memory lines that
have not been re-encrypted cannot be correctly decrypted,
thus resulting in an inconsistent state.
To guarantee crash consistency of page re-encryption,
we employ the ADR mechanism (providing battery backup
for the write queue) on the RSR. The battery overhead is
negligible, since the size of RSR is very small, i.e., 20
bytes, including 32-bit physical page number, 64-bit old
major counter and 64-bit done bits. The data stored in the
RSR are flushed into NVM in case of a system failure using
the ADR and loaded into RSR again when the system is
recovered. Thus the system knows which page is being re-
encrypted and which memory lines in the page have not been
re-encrypted, based on the content of the RSR. Hence, the
system can continue to complete the page re-encryption after
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Figure 11: The numbers of NVM write requests normalized to those of Unsec-PM with different transaction sizes. (The black
line with circles in each figure shows the percentage of reduced counter writes via CWR in SecPM.)
the recovery from a system failure. Moreover, the process
of re-encrypting each memory line is the same as that the
memory controller deals with a regular cache line flush as
shown in Figure 7. Thus the consistency of writing each re-
encrypted line is also ensured by the CWT scheme, and the
performance of page re-encryption is also improved by the
CWR scheme, since the writes during a page re-encryption
have good spatial locality.
4 Performance Evaluation
4.1 Methodology
As real hardware is not available yet for implementing
NVMM and the proposed persistence and encryption
schemes, we use gem5 [4] with NVMain [33] to evaluate
SecPM. NVMain is a cycle-accuratemain memory simulator
for emerging NVM technologies. The NVM system consists
of x86-64 processors running at 2GHz, 32KB L1 data and
instruction caches, 512KB L2 caches, and 4MB L3 cache.
The counter cache is 1MB. Without loss of generality, we
model PCM technologies [8] with 16GB capacity. The
PCM latency model is the same as that used in Xu el al.’s
work [49]. The encryption and decryption latencies of
AES circuit are 40ns [29, 40]. To support the simulation
of persistent memory, we employ the clwb and sfence
instructions that have been implemented in the latest gem5.
Since the performance improvement of SecPM mainly
comes from the counter write reduction (CWR) scheme
as presented in Section 3.4, we compare SecPM with the
SecPM w/o CWR which indicates the SecPM without the
proposed CWR scheme. Moreover, we also consider an
Table 3: The configurations of the NVM system.
Processor
CPU 4 cores, X86-64 processor, 2 GHz
Private L1 cache 64KB, 8-way, LRU, 2-CPU-cycle latency
Private L2 cache 512KB, 8-way, LRU, 8-CPU-cycle latency
Shared L3 cache 4MB, 8-way, LRU, 30-CPU-cycle latency
Main Memory
Capacity 16GB, 16 banks in 2 ranks
PCM latency model tRCD/tCL/tCWD/tFAW/tWTR/tWR
=48/15/13/50/7.5/300 ns
En/decryption latency 40 ns
Write queue 32 entries
Counter cache 1 MB, 8-way, LRU, 12-CPU-cycle latency
unsecure persistent memory without memory encryption
(Unsec-PM) as a baseline for comparisons. We do not
compare the performance of programmer-transparentSecPM
with Liu et al.’s work [29] due to no open-source codes and
different design goals.
We use five workloads to evaluate the performance of
SecPM as listed in the following. The five workloads are
also widely used in existing work on persistent memory [9,
21, 23, 29, 37].
• Array. Initializing a 1GB array and then randomly
swapping entries.
• Queue. Randomly enqueueing and dequeueing entries
in a 1GB queue.
• B-tree. Inserting random key-value items into a 2GB
B-tree based key-value store.
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Figure 12: The average latency of executing each transaction with different transaction sizes. (The black line with circles in
each figure shows the percentage of reduced latency that SecPM uses CWR).
• Hash table. Inserting random key-value items into a
2GB hash table based key-value store.
• RB-tree. Inserting random key-value items into a 2GB
red-black tree.
The ACID property (atomicity, consistency, isolation, and
durability) of operations in these workloads is ensured via
durable transaction, like existing work [28, 29, 31, 37].
4.2 Experimental Results
We first present the experimental results of Unsec-PM,
SecPM, and SecPM w/o CWR in terms of the the number
of write requests and transaction execution latency. We
then evaluate the sensitivity of the experimental results under
different configuration parameters.
4.2.1 The Number of Write Requests
Since the proposed CWR scheme improves the system
performance by employing the spatial locality of log and data
writes, different transaction request sizes exhibit different
spatial locality, hence having a great impact on the system
performance. Thus we vary the transaction request sizes in
the five workloads from 64B to 4KB to evaluate the number
of NVM writes.
Figure 11 shows the number of write requests to NVM
normalized to that of Unsec-PM in the five workloads. We
observe the SecPM w/o CWR achieves the security and
crash consistency but incurs about 2× writes compared with
Unsec-PM, whatever the transaction request size is. The
reason is that each data write in secure NVM produces two
write requests: one for the data and the other for the counter.
Compared with the SecPM w/o CWR, SecPM significantly
reduces the number of NVM writes. Even in the worst case
where the request size is 64B (which means only a cache
line is written in a transaction), SecPM reduces 22%− 37%
of counter writes compared with the SecPM w/o CWR,
since the transaction data writes have no locality while the
log writes have locality. When the transaction request size
increases, the locality of data writes significantly increases.
SecPM reduces 62%−75%, 86%−88%, and 90%−93% of
counter writes compared with the SecPM w/o CWR, when
the transaction sizes are 256B, 1KB, and 4KB, respectively.
4.2.2 Transaction Execution Latency
We vary the transaction request sizes in the five workloads
from 64B to 4KB to evaluate the transaction execution
latency.
Figure 12 shows the average latency of executing each
transaction with different transaction sizes. We observe that
the SecPM w/o CWR increases the transaction execution
latency by 2− 3× across these workloads compared with
Unsec-PM, since doubling the number of write requests
to NVM significantly degrades the system performance.
Compared with the SecPM w/o CWR, SecPM significantly
reduces the average transaction execution latency via re-
ducing the number of counter writes. In the worst case
where the transaction size is 64B, SecPM still reduces the
transaction execution latency by 20%− 29% compared with
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Figure 13: The percentage of reduced counter writes and
average latency of executing each transaction with different
transaction sizes.
the SecPMw/o CWR, due to reducing 22%−37%of counter
writes as evaluated in Section 4.2.1. When the transaction
sizes are 256B, 1KB, and 4KB, SecPM reduces 29%−36%,
37%− 41%, and 43%− 51% of average execution latency
respectively, compared with the SecPM w/o CWR. When
the transaction sizes are larger than 1KB, SecPM incurs only
a little latency increase, compared with Unsec-PM, which
comes from the the latency overhead of data encryption and
decryption. In summary, SecPM speeds up the transaction
execution by 1.3×−2.0× via the CWR scheme, due to the
reduction in the number of write requests, and achieves the
performance close to an unsecure persistent memory system
for large transactions.
4.2.3 Sensitivity to Write Queue Size
We use the fixed configurations of 1MB counter cache and
1KB transaction size, and vary the write queue length from
8 to 128 to evaluate the performance in terms of the number
of write requests and transaction execution latency.
Figure 13a shows the influence of different write queue
lengths on the percentage of reduced counter writes in
SecPM, compared with the SecPM w/o CWR. We observe
that SecPM reduces more counter writes with longer write
queue. The reason is that longer write queue provides more
opportunities for the CWR scheme to find and merge more
counter writes with the same physical address in the write
queue. For most workloads including queue, B-tree, hash
table and RB-tree, when the write queue length is larger
than 32, the percentage of reduced counter writes increases
little. When the write queue length increases from 8 to 128,
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Figure 14: Evaluating SecPM with different counter cache
sizes.
SecPM reduces 17%, 11%, 11%, 11%, and 10% of more
counter writes for array, queue, B-tree, hash table, and RB-
tree workloads, respectively.
Figure 13b shows the influence of different write queue
lengths on the transaction execution latency in SecPM. We
observe that increasing the write queue length decreases
the average latency of executing each transaction in all
workloads, since longer write queue reduces more counter
writes. When the write queue length increases from 8 to 128,
SecPM reduces the average transaction execution latency by
31%, 11%, 17%, 27%, and 9% for array, queue, B-tree, hash
table, and RB-tree workloads, respectively.
4.2.4 Sensitivity to Counter Cache Size
We use the fixed configurations of 32-entry write queue
and 1KB transaction size, and vary the counter cache size
from 1KB to 4MB to evaluate the counter cache hit rate and
workload execution time.
Figure 14a shows the influence of different counter cache
sizes on the cache hit rate in SecPM. We observe that
increasing the counter cache size has a great impact on the
counter cache hit rates for array, hash table, and RB-tree,
but rarely affects those of queue and B-tree. The reason
is that the dequeue or enqueue in the queue accesses a
continuous memory space and B-tree has the structure that
a node continuously stores multiple key-value items, which
exhibit good spatial locality for data accesses. In contrast,
the random entry swaps in the array, inserting items into
random hash locations in the hash table, and the structure
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Figure 15: The concurrent transaction throughput in the
1/2/4/8-core systems.
of one item per node in the RB-tree exhibit poor spatial
locality for data accesses. The good spatial locality for data
accesses produces high counter cache hit rate. When reading
a memory line in a page, all counters that decrypt this page
are loaded into the counter cache, due to being stored in
a memory line. The following accesses to the same page
always hit the counter cache. As shown in Figure 14a, when
the counter cache size increases from 1KB to 4MB, the cache
hit rate is improved by 12%, 14%, and 3% for array, hash
table and rb-tree workloads.
Figure 14b shows the influence of different counter cache
sizes on the overall execution time of workloads in SecPM.
The execution time of workloads under different counter
cache sizes are normalized to those under 1KB counter cache
size. We observe that different counter cache sizes have
little impact on the execution time of queue and B-tree
workloads. For array, hash table, and RB-tree, the execution
performance is improved respectively by 4%, 5%, and 1%,
when the counter cache size increases from 1KB to 4MB.
4.2.5 Multiple-core Performance
We evaluate the performance of SecPM in a multi-core
system, where each thread executes the same transactions
on different cores. We use the configurations of 32-entry
write queue, 1KB transaction size, and 1MB counter cache.
Figure 15 shows the transaction throughput of different
workloads in the 1/2/4/8-core systems. We observe that
the transaction throughput of workloads in SecPM scales
well with the increase of the number of cores. Moreover,
compared with the SecPM w/o CWR, SecPM improves the
transaction throughput by 64%, 81%, 90% and 95% on
average in a 1/2/4/8-core system respectively.
5 Related Work
• Secure Non-volatile Memory. As NVM suffers from
the data remanence vulnerability, data security in NVM has
been widely studied. DEUCE [55] proposes a dual-counter
encryption scheme to reduce the write traffic in the encrypted
NVM by re-encrypting only the modified words in a memory
line. Based on DEUCE, SECRET [44] further avoids the
re-encryption of zero-content words in a memory line to
reduce bit writes. Silent Shredder [3] reduces NVM writes
in the encrpted NVM by eliminating the full-zero cache
line writes produced from data shredding. DeWrite [59]
proposes a lightweight deduplication scheme to enhance
the performance and endurance of the encrypted NVM via
eliminating duplicate-content writes. All these schemes on
the encrypted NVM mainly focus on reducing the writes of
encrypted data to NVM, which do not consider the crash
consistency in the secure NVM. Moreover, some existing
works focusing on memory authentication in NVM [36,
54], which are orthogonal to our work, as discussed in
Section 3.1.
• Crash Consistency in Non-volatileMemory. To achieve
data persistence, various durable transaction systems, such
as NV-Heaps [9], Mnemosyne [47], DudeTM [28],
NVML [20], and DCT [22], are proposed to manage
persistent data with crash consistency in NVM. Moreover,
multiple NVM-based file systems, such as BPFS [10],
PMFS [13], Mojim [56], NOVA [50], and NOVA-
Fortis [51], are proposed to achieve the improvement of
storage performance by leveraging the byte-addressable
benefit of NVM, which also provide the crash consistency
guarantee by employing copy-based techniques, e.g.,
logging, copy-on-write (shadowing page), and replication.
All these schemes are built on the un-encrypted NVM,
without considering the memory encryption on NVM.
SecPM aims to ensure both the security and crash
consistency of NVM. In terms of addressing the crash
consistency of secure NVM, the most related work comes
from Liu et al. [29], which is the first work to efficiently
ensure that data and its counter are atomically persisted
via the selective counter-atomicity. For a different design
goal, i.e., programmer transparency, SecPM performs only
slight modifications on the memory controller to achieve
crash consistency. Moreover, SecPM achieves significant
performance improvement and write reduction via a counter
write reduction scheme.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes SecPM to achieve both the security and
persistence in non-volatile main memory. SecPM leverages
a counter cache write-through scheme with a register to
guarantee crash consistency of durable transaction as well
as atomic writes in secure NVM. Moreover, a counter
write reduction (CWR) scheme is introduced to improve
the system performance. These schemes are implemented
with slight modifications only on the hardware layer, which
are transparent for programmers and applications. Thus
programs and applications running on an un-encryptedNVM
can be directly executed on a secure NVM with SecPM.
Experimental results demonstrate that SecPM achieves the
performance close to an unsecure persistent memory system
for large transactions.
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